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A TURNING POINT IN AVIATION TRAINING:
THE AQP MANDATES
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
AND LINE OPERATIONAL SIMULATIONS
Thomas R. Weitzel and Henry R. Lehrer, Ph.D.
ABSTRACT

Crew Resource Management (CRM) and Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) have not
been mandatory elements ofair carrier flight crew training. Additionally, Full-Flight Simulation
and Flight Training Devices (FTDs) have been tools utilized to various degrees by the different
air carrier training departments. Each air carrier's training program has traditionally been
approved by its Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Principal Operations Inspector (POI).
The Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) is an alternative method of training air carrier
flight crewmembers and will be a voluntaryprogram applicable to airline certificate holders under
the Code ofFederal Regulations Section 14 (14 CFR--encompasses aeronautics and space) Parts
121 and 135.
The FAA has facilitated the implementation ofAQPs with the issuance ofa Special Federal
Aviation Regulation (SFAR 58), rather than rewriting the numerous Federal Aviation
Regulations (FARs) which detail air camer training. Additionally, an Air Carrier Training
Branch (AFS-210) has been established to administer AQPs, with quality control being
developed by a human factors specialist. Mandatory CRM training and the utilization of Line
Operational Simulations (LOS--a rechristening of LOFT) are key elements of the AQP
curriculum for flight crewmembers. As AQPs are approved, increased utilization of FTDs may
augment and optimize Full-Flight Simulation. "... it is anticipated that AQP will become
standard practice in the future for FAR Parts 121 and 135 operators" (Longridge and Boothe,
1991).
BACKGROUND

Two chilling statistics were
raised early during the December 1990 Third Human Error
AvoidanceTechniques Conference at Dallas, Texas:
1. From 1980 to 1989, over 72
percent of the world's
airline hull losses were

avoidably crew caused--only
a slight improvement over
the previous decade.
2. If the current rate stays
absolutely flat, a projection
based on the increase in
the Dumber of airplanes in
service shows that, by the
year 2005, there will be an
airline hull loss somewhere

Published by Scholarly14
Commons, 1992

in the world approximately
every two weeks. (Scahill,
1991, p. 43)
However, we have endured
such losses for many years
and, unfortunately, many of
the loses were a result of
human failing. Historically, the
1961 crash of a British aircraft
in Norway was one of the first
documented cases of a flight
crew performance-related accident. Listed among the contributing factors of that accident
were the added stress of a
long delay prior to departure
coupled with poor destination
weather and:
the Viking used to fly

with two pilots and a
radio officer. There is a
third seat for this third
man in the cockpit. But
then it became standard
procedure to fly the
Viking without the radio
officer. He was regarded
as redundant. A change
in philosophy you know.
Withoutsubstituting new
mechanical aids, his
absence meant extra
workload for the pilots.
They could cope with it,
in normal circumstances.
Others have been coping
with it ever since.
(Barlay, 1970, p. 12.)
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In another accident (NTSBAAR-SO-5), among the factors
contributing to the crash were
inadequate company and crew
managementofresour~;a~o

cited were fatigue and individual high workload. Similarly,
the 1982 Air Florida crash in
Washington, DC during a blizzard (NTSB-AAR-82-8) had
causal factors related to
inappropriate crew decisions
and inadequate company as
well as FAA monitoring of
crew training procedures.
In retrospect, there seems
to be a common thread running through each of these
accident reports. The thread is
that seemingly well trained
and highly motivated flight
deck crews are making many
incorrect and/or inappropriate
decisions resulting in a
preventable loss of life and
property. To this end the FAA
has recently taken positive and
possibly far reaching steps
toward developing new and
more appropriate means of
training certificated air carrier
flight crews.
TRAINING FOR THE 1990s
FAR Parts 61, 63, 65, 108,

121, and 135 contain regulations covering air carrier
training programs. These parts
designate training and qualification requirements, including
applicable certification
requirements, for airline
operationspersonnel. Subparts
Nand 0 of FAR 121 contain
the most detailed and rigorous
training and qualification
requirements. However, the
last comprehensive changes to
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subparts Nand 0 were made
in 1970.
The FARs have focused on
the training of individua~ and
have not referred to the training of crews. Consequently,
crew concept training such as
CRM and LOFr have been
extracurricular in terms of the
FARs. The FARs have tended
to emphasize redundant
checks of basic aircraft
maneuvers; e.g., takeoffs, area
departures, steep turns, and
stal~.

Concurrently, Boeing (one
of only three Western world
manufacturers of large turbojet transports) has placed over
400 high-technology Boeing
757s and 767s into service
with U.S. airlines. Cockpits in
these aircraft have led their
two-pilot crews to refer to the
aircraft as "electric jets."
As pilots have moved into high-technology cockpits requiring new skills,
they are finding that
recurrent training to
comply with regulations
is akin to a professor
reciting the alphabet to
a government monitor
every six months. (Ott,
1990,

p. 68)

In August 1987, then FAA
Administrator T. Allan
McArtor urged the development of a joint government/
industry task force to study
flight crew performance.
Among other perceived problems on air carrier flight
decks, the task force addressed
flight crew training. The task
force forwarded to FAA a

series of recommendations to
improve the flight crewmember operating environment, knowledge of human
factors, and pilot training. The
result has been SFAR 58,
which outlines the steps an
airline can take to establish its
own AQP--an FAA-approved
training program.
The AQP will be an alternative method for meeting
training, evaluation, certification, and qualification
requirements for the following: flight crewmembers
(pilOts and flight engineers),
flight attendants, aircraft
dispatchers, instructors,
evaluators, and other operations personnel, e.g., aircraft
mechanics. An objective of the
AQP will be to enhance these
professionals' qualifications
above the standards of Parts
121 and 135. This article will
encompass only Part 121 flight
crewmember training.
Utilization of a systematic
approach to training analysis,
curriculum development,
implementation, and evaluation will be fundamental to
the AQP. Another fundamental underpinning of this
program will be proficiencybased training and qualification. Time spent in AQP
training will be quality,
planned hours instead of
programmed hours. Training
will be conducted until the
student night cre~ember
successfu~ly completes
the
program.
All AQPs will require the
incorporation of CRM and
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LOS in the curriculums.
Accordingly, the AFS-210 has
published FAA Advisory
Circulars (ACs) 120-51 (1989)
and 120-35B (1990b) covering,
respectively, CRM training
and evaluation and LOS training and evaluation. Additionally, the SUbjects of ACs
120-45A (l990a) and 120-40B
(1991b) are, respectively,
FIDs and Airplane Simulator
Qualification. AC 120-54
(1991a) with the subject
matter of the AQP has been
published and will be
discussed later in this article.
THEAQP
FUNDAMENTAlS AND
PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
The FAA has established
AFS-210, which includes a
human factors scientist on
staff, in Washington, DC, to
administer the AQP applications and operations. Air
carriers v.ill have to work with
AFS·:!10 through a five-phase
prQC.eS..\ to establish an AQP.
The five p~. as defined by
the FAA (1~)C) in SFAR 58,
are:
1. Phase One. The initial
application by an air carrier
stato performance Objectives and their planned implementation. At this point,
an AFS-210 team will be
assigned to the carrier.
2. Phase Two. The curriculum development, according to the Air Line Pilots
Association (ALPA), is "the
most important phase"
(1990, April, p. 17). Analysis of training goals and
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Objectives, incorporating
task analyses and evaluation strategies, will result in
written curriculum.
3. Phase Three. Implementation schedules and requirements will be produced,
and instructors and evaluators will be trained.
4. Phase Four. Initial operations ~ will begin, and data
will be collected to analyze
the program.
5. Phase Five. IT proceeding as
planned, the operations will
continue.
(A more detailed explanation
exists within the 1990 SFAR
58.) The AFS-210 will assure
that an approved AQP will:
1. Improve safety by training
flight crewmembers to
proficiency.
2. Incorporate CRM
principles.
3. Employ LOS for training
and evaluations.
4. Initiate or improve instructor and evaluator qualification programs.
5. Utilize a crew complement
for training and qualification.
6. Utilize appropriate advanced training equipment.
The roles and responsibilities
of the POls will be to:
1. Involve themselves fully in
air carriers' AQP reviews
and evaluation processes.
2. Work with both applicant
air carriers and the AFS210 during AQP applications.
3. Issue final approvals, in
conjunction with the Manager of AFS-210, which per-

mit continued operation of
AQPs.
CRM and LOS
The National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
(NASA) review of air carrier
accidents between 1968 and
1976 identified 62 accidents
related to improper resource
management. The COCkpit
skills identified with resource
management included
communication, leadership,
planning, problem solving, and
decision making (Sams, 1987).
During the mid-1980s,
Helmreich (1984) began to
clarify the much maligned
term "pilot error." Helmreich
and NASA research demonstrated that the majority of air
carrier transport accidents
were caused by failures in
team communication and
coordination.
Most of us are familiar
with the common stereotype of the pilot as a
fearless, self-sufficient,
technically qualified, and
sligh tly ego tis tical
individual, whose job
description calls for the
defiance of death on a
regular basis. (Foushee
and Helmreich, 1988, p.
191).
Pilots with such traits were
unlikely to function well in
the multi-pilot crew when
there was a need for teamwork
and group decision making.
The FAA has allowed air
carriers some latitude in
developing their own unique
approaches to CRM. This latitude may be attributable to a
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lack of a uniform, industrywide definition of how to
approach such training.
Specifically, the FAA (1989)
has defined CRM with seven
basic concepts and recommends four phases of teaching,
while Sams (1987) listed
numerous additional sources
of CRM concepts and training
strategies. Schwartz (1987), on
the other hand, listed 10
topics associated with CRM
which closely parallel the 14
CRM tools delineated (for
statistical purposes) by
Helmreich, Wilhelm,
Gregorich, and Chidester
(1990). Indeed, there have
been many definitions of
CRM.
Helmreich et at (1990)
reported the first data from
the NASAlUniversity of Texas
Crew Performance project on
the behavior of flightcrews
with and without formal
CRM. Fifteen rating areas of
CRM included 14 areas of
behavior (the tools) and the
overall evaluation. Both
LOFr scenarios and line
operations were studied at two
air carriers; one with CRM
and LOFr already in place,
and the other in early initiation of both. The results
indicated that a formal CRM
program resulted in an
increased percentage of crews
rated as above average in
performance. There was also a
decrease in the percentage
rated as below average.
Classroom training of CRM
has traditionally created a
subset of tlight crewmembers
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who react negatively
(Helmreich and Wilhelm,
1989). The incorporation of
crew as well as individual
CRM evaluations in LOS
scenarios is designed into the
AQP to address this problem.
The mandated combination of
CRM and LOS evaluations
has been designed to address
communications in two-pilot
crews. Kanki, Lozito, and
Foushee (1989) concluded that
standardizationofcommunication patterns enhances the
performance of the two-pilot
crew; and Wiener (1989)
addressed this problem
specifically in the "glass
cockpit" aircraft. The electric
jets studied by Wiener pose
problems at the human-automation interface. Incorporation of standard communications, and the appropriate
separation of the human from
the automation, will be quintessential to the CRM and
LOS ingredients of an AQP
designed to properly interface
flight crewmembers and the
airplanes they fly.
In discussing situational
awareness, SChwartz (1987)
stated that CRM skills are
needed to:
1. Handle the increasing flow
of information available
from both inside and
outside the cockpit.
2. Understand today's aircraft
which, though increasingly
automated, are often
extremely complex.
3. Assure that flight crews
perform as a coordinated
team.

4. Fit into an evermore demandingATCenvironment.
5. Integrate corporate pressures to go to new and
different places.
6. Cope with changing skill
and experience levels
among associates.
7. Avoid complacency. (p 5)
Decision making involving
good judgment is common to
most definitions of CRM.
Fo~al training or education
in good pilot judgment has
generally been considered as
unattainable by the aviation
community (Buch and Diehl,
1984). However, if a formal
judgment matrix were
designed, it must not conflict
with any FAA legalities,
approved procedures, or
checklists; or any of the air
carrier's operational policies.
Line Operational Simulations (LOS) will utilize
scenarios of operational
problems and environmental
conditions. LOS elements will
be similar to those of LOFT:
(a) a line environment; (b) a
complete crew, with no substitution of instructors or evaluators; (c) random real world,
real time scenarios; and (d)
the option of runs which are
uninterrupted. In addition,
unlike LOFr, the simulations
must include evaluation of
each crewmember, crew competence, and crew performance (FAA, 1990b).
EVALUATIONS AND DATA
A small, random sample of
flight crewmembers would be
among the first crews enrolled
in an air carrier's early AQP.
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An audit and analysis of performances by this group would
serve as a formative evaluation
of the AQP courseware for
technical accuracy, instructional soundness, and suitability for use. Additionally,
simulator flight proficiency
training will permit flight
crewmembers to experience
and practice events which are
not normally encountered in
day-to-day flight operations.
The training to proficiency
will necessitate the evaluation
of crews and individuals.
Results of data obtained from
this process can be evaluated,
possibly necessitating curriculum revisions.
Crew members will be provided with forms to evaluate
the AQP. These evaluation
forms will be comprised of
several Likert scale questions,
and questions or statements
soliciting comments. Likert
scales may be from "1" to "5",
or "1" to "7"; the Likert
extremes could be from:
Unrealistic to Realistic; Easy
to Difficult; Poor to Well;
Useless to Useful; Absolutely
nothing to A tremendous
amount; or Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree.
Sample questions and statements soliciting comments are
an important, integral part of
the evaluation process. The
CRM advisory circular 120-51
(1989) incorporates a sample
student evaluation as well as
other guidelines for student
evaluations. For the AQP,
sample questions could be:
1. Was the simulator a fair
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evaluation of your abilities
as a crewmember?
2. Did the instructor provide
the necessary guidance and
techniques to improve
proficiency in your crew
position?
3. What did you find most
useful in ground training?
4. What do you feel would
improve the effectiveness of
the AQP?
FINANCIAL
CONSIDERATIONS

The FAA (199Oc) has mentioned the AQP as possibly
extending the time between
crewmember visits to the
training center as a financial
consideration for air carriers.
However, ALPA (1990)
believes that the time between
visits to the training center
should not be extended
beyond the annual recurrent
and six-month proficiency
checks that are now required.
Ott (1990) mentioned that
although the AQP was established in concert with the Air
Transport Association, association members have expressed
concern that additional training costs may be significant.
Statistically, several years of
AQP will be necessary to
build a database for comparison to the accident history of
the last 30 years.
The FAA utilized air
carrier accident statistics for
the past 20 years to arrive at a
historical annual aocidentoost
of approximately $66 million
for Part 121 and 135 operators. Projecting the accident
rates for the next five years

resulted in an average annual
economic loss estimated to be
$145 million for Part 121 and
135 air carriers. The FAA
projected an average annual
cost savings of $70.8 million
for Part 121 and 135 operators, if all were to utilize the
AQP for the next five years
(199Oc). The FAA also utilized a comparison of two AQP
benefit-cost five year cases for
Part 121 and 135 air carriers.
In the first case, it was
assumed 100% of the large
Part 121 and Part 135 operators would participate in the
AQP starting in the first year.
It was also assumed that the
AQP would be only 20% effective in the reduction of
crew-caused accidents. A worst
case scenario was considered
for comparison. Only 5% of
the crews for the large Part
121 and Part 135 operators
would participate in the AQP,
and its effectiveness would be
only 1% (199Oc).
The first case resulted in a
possible five-year savings to
the industry of $443 million
(1990 dollars); costs were projected at $88 million. The
second case resulted in a fiveyear stream of benefits of $22
million; costs were $10 million. Both benefit ratios would
be higher· if the AQP were to
be more than 20% effective in
reducing crew-caused air carrier accidents (FAA, 199Oc).
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

The AQP front-end curriculum development may also
result in an initial analysis of
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training system devices and
motion-based simulation. The
consequence of such analysis
may be the utilization of more
FTDs in the curriculum. This
utilization may also drive the
FAA and/or NASA to further
study motion-based simulation
and its transfer of training to
transport category aircraft
operations. Experimental
results of the transfer of
training with motion-based
simulation may end the
question of duplicity which
exists today with respect to air
carrier simulation.
Other regions of the world
are experiencing rates of crewcaused air carrier accidents
greater than that of the U.S.;
some of these goo-regional
rates are in excess of six times
greater than the U.S. rate.
Given today's globalized
society, future research should
probably evaluate the human

factors and crew training
approaches for the air carriers
of the following regions:
Europe, AsialPacific, Latin
America, and Africa/Middle
East.
Perhaps there will be a true
turning point in aviation
training, but it is yet to be
determined whether the
certificated air carriers will
readily embrace this new
concept or whether the AQP
will have the intended effect
on aviation safety. There are
several air lines that have
already progressed to Phase 2
of the AQP. As of this date,
United, Delta, and Northwest
Airlines have reached this
stage, and several additional
major airlines and regionals
are progressing with AQP.
AC 120-54 seems to be a
landmark attempt at providing
a framework for the industry
and the FAA to work more

closely in concert than ever
before. IT this joint association
bears fruit, it may provide
innovative ways to better prepare not only flight crewmembers but flight attendants,
aircraft dispatchers, instructors, evaluators, and other
operations personnel subject
to the training and evaluations
requirements of FAR parts
121 and 135. This enabling
movement could serve as the
catalyst to assist a flight crews
to better work together. The
time may finally be at hand
when the manner in which the
whole process of cockpit
interaction and ~anagement
of resources will be talked
about less and acted upon
more completely. The industry
as well as the traveling public
could all benefit; AQP may be
a win-win situation for alI.[]
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